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The principal vice in the Respondents' Brief is that it responds to so very little of what was 
contained in Appellants' Brief. Arguments made by the Appellants are simply ignored. What 
response is found from the Respondents has a thread of meaning but without much spine. Much 
of the compelling Idaho precedent provided by Appellants is similarly not addressed and 
conclusory opinions are repeatedly stated as facts. The following will address these errors and 
omISSIOns. 
II. 
WAS AND IS THERE A QUESTION OF FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT? 
In Appellants' Opening Brief the argument that "circumstances" as stated in such cases 
as Bonz v. Sud weeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876, 880 (1991), imply that the underlying 
facts will drive a decision as to what constitutes objective proof of actual damage for purposes of 
the accrual of a cause of action against an attomey. These are material facts of a genuine nature. 
The Appellants' question was posed "Do we automatically decide the issue of objective proof of 
damage which is so dependent on the underlying facts by means of summary judgment motions 
(or appellate decisions) or do we allow, when a jury has been requested, the decision to be made 
by the trier of fact?" This argument finds no response in Law firm's briefing. 
In Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 880 (Idaho 2007), this Court acknowledged that 
"The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a question of fact, 
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depending on whether any disputed issues of material fact exist .... where there is conflicting 
evidence as to when the cause of actions arose, the issue is one of fact for the trier of fact .... " 
Citing Kimbrough v. Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 516 (Idaho 1997). 
Objective proof of actual damage requires an analysis of the underlying facts or, if you 
will, of the "circumstances" underlying each case. When did something occur? This is a 
question of fact. It is a material and genuine question of fact. 1 At what point in time did 
objective proof of actual damage exist? That is a time question. Where a jury has been 
requested it is thus a jury question. The "when" question must be answered by determining a 
date which is the date at which objective proof of actual damage exists and the clock starts 
ticking. That date is a material question of fact. "A material fact is one upon which the outcome 
ofthe case may be different." Peterson v. Romaine, 131 Idaho 537, 960 P.2d 1266 (Idaho 1998). 
This argument has not been addressed by the Respondents. But the argument exists. It is 
submitted that it is worthy of this Court's consideration and adoption in the context of attorney 
malpractice cases. 
III. 
THE MISSING CASES 
Although Respondents cite Buxton throughout their Memorandum, they have omitted to 
mention (much less distinguish) four cases which are the cornerstone of the Buxton decision. 
These are Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984), Chicoine v. Bignall, 
122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992), Fairway Development Co. v. Peterson, Moss, 
I Even Judge Williamson's decision below recognized that time is a question offact. That is why she refused to 
grant summary judgment on the issue of what constituted a "reasonable time." See, also, CIT Financial Services v. 
Hub's Indoor RV Center, 108 Idaho 820, 822, 702 P.2d 858, 860 (Id. App. 1985), where a question of the actual date 
of default precluded summary judgment. 
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Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993), and Mack Financial Corporation 
v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986). It would be unnecessarily redundant to explain the 
holdings in each of these cases. That has already been done in Appellants' Opening Brief. The 
refusal of Respondents to deal with these cases is suspected to be more than a mere oversight, 
however. These cases, as incorporated within and approved by Buxton, happen to be the law in 
this jurisdiction regarding objective proof of actual damage in attorney malpractice cases. To 
leave them undiscussed, undistinguished, and untouched is rather telling. Instead, Respondents 
engage in a mantra-like conclusory assertion which appears over and over and over in their Brief 
that the damage occurred at the instant that Quasar defaulted.2 
Some defendants become stubborn with opposition because their convictions are all that 
they have. This is such a case. Respondents are not accurately reflecting the state of Idaho law 
in their response to Appellants' Opening Brief and merely state and restate their convictions. 
City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009) trumps any convictions 
the Respondents offer. "[T]here must be objective proof that would support the existence of 
some actual damage." At 661. A cause of action for negligence cannot accrue until there is 
objective proof of actual damage. Id "Negligence that increases the risk that a client will be 
harmed does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs." Id 
Here, objective proof did not occur untii, at the earliest, there was a court decision adverse to the 
Reynolds, i.e., March 11, 2008. Since this action was filed on March 9, 2010, the statute of 
limitations, I.e. § 5-219(4), does not act as a bar. 
2 See Respondents' Brief, pps. 6, 7 (two times), 10, 11, 12 (two times), 13 (two times), 14 (two times), and 15. 
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IV. 
DID JUDGE WILLIAMSON'S ORDER TRIGGER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? 
Respondents argue strongly (and incorrectly) that it is Appellants' position that Judge 
Williamson's Order triggered the running of the statute of limitations. This reflects a careless or 
incomplete reading of Appellants' argument. At p. 15 of Appellants' Opening Brief, Appellants 
commented that "it is perhaps arguable that there was objective proof of damage at that time" (at 
the time of Judge Williamson's Order). Appellants continued, however, stating "but since Judge 
Williamson did not decide that issue, one way or the other, it appears that there was no damage 
until and unless there was a judgment against Reynolds on the time term or unless Reynolds was 
not made whole upon the resolution of the case. 
This is a distinction that is not very subtle at all. This is the Chicoine or Masingill model. 
No damage had occurred at the time of Judge Williamson's Order and it is Appellants' position 
that that decision was not a triggering event. Even if it was, though, this action was filed within 
two years of the Order by Judge Williamson which only partially decided the breach of contract 
action against Quasar. 
v. 
THE "GOTCHA" MOMENT 
Respondents argue that when they filed a lawsuit against Quasar on behalf of Appellants 
the Complaint" ... asserted that they (Appellants) 'had been damaged in an amount to be 
proven at trial, including but not limited to, the amount of the earnest money deposit and other 
incidental and consequential damages ... '" (Respondents' Brief, p. 2; R., p. 55.) This language, 
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itself authored by the Respondents, is then leveraged into a conclusion that the Reynolds then 
knew they had been damaged and, therefore, objective proof of actual damage had already 
occurred. 
Nothing is unless a court or a jury says that it is. This is a shorthand way of saying that 
allegations in a complaint or arguments of learned counsel are not "true" until and unless the trier 
of fact agrees with those allegations and their supporting arguments by virtue of a verdict or 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw.3 
The argument made by Law Firm at p. 2 of its Brief that Appellants' allegation in the 
Complaint drafted and filed on their behalf by Law Firm that they "had been damaged" is 
dispositive of the question of when there was objective proof of damage. If that allegation in the 
Reynolds' Complaint against Quasar is to be construed as "objective proof of actual damage" 
(Buxton, at 61; Chicoine v. Bignall, at 482), then every time a plaintiff complains of some injury 
the case would not have to go to trial on that issue since there is already - as stated in the 
referenced Complaint against Quasar - "objective proof." The defense bar can rest easy though. 
Such is not the law. The mere allegation of damage in a Complaint filed in a contract action 
does not provide the "objective proof of actual damage" required by the multiple decisions of 
this Supreme Court. 
3 The sole exceptions being where there is an admission by the opposing party or no dispute on the relevant facts. 
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VI. 
DOES THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES TRIGGER THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS? 
The argument of Law Finn that since Appellants "began to incur substantial attorneys' 
fees and costs" in connection with Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money upon demand 
completely fails in light of Buxton. Law Finn has turned a blind eye on Chicoine's teaching as 
reaffinned by Buxton at 660: 
Even though he had incurred attorney fees in defending the action after his 
attorney's negligent act in failing to timely request a new trial, this Court 
held that "there was no objective proof of some actual damage to Chicoine 
until this Court reversed the order granting a new trial in O'Neil II." 122 
Idaho at 487,835 P.2d at 1298. 
VII. 
SHOULD A DRAFTING ATTORNEY BECOME A DEFENDANT WHENEVER THERE 
IS A DISPUTE OVER THE TERMS OF A DISPUTED CONTRACT? 
The Respondents are angling for a ruling from this Court which can be 
succinctly stated: 
Where an attorney drafts a contract which is arguably breached by the other party 
and the drafting attorney then sues the non-client party, the attorney must advise 
the client to sue him (or her) within two years of the first notice of breach in order 
to preserve the client's rights. 
The attorney-client relationship is built upon trust and loyalty. Tne attorney owes the 
client absolute loyalty, competence and diligence and that is why the client has come to the 
attorney. This is fundamenta1.4 In this case, the same attorney who drafted the Agreement for 
the Reynolds - the tenns of which were disputed by Quasar - then represented the Reynolds in 
4 See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, §§ 1.1 and 1.3; Rule 1.7, Commentary [1]. 
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the subsequent lawsuit against Quasar. In undertaking the role of Plaintiffs' attorney against 
Quasar, Mr. Krueck signed a Complaint he drafted designed to make his client whole, i.e., the 
Reynolds should suffer zero loss, zero damage. 
Clearly, there were two different and opposing points of view put forward by Quasar and 
Reynolds.S The Answer filed by Quasar ( R. 58) documents that a contest had arisen. Was the 
Agreement clear? Did the Agreement say what Law Firm said that it did? Law Firm was 
apparently representing the Reynolds in good faith and was attempting to vindicate its 
unfortunately imprecise draftsmanship and prove that Quasar was in breach of contract. 
Law Firm now argues that Reynolds should have found yet another attorney and sued it 
and the drafting attorney for professional negligence even while they were asserting on behalf of 
the Reynolds that there was clarity in the terms of the Agreement it had prepared and that the 
breach was unlawful. There is nothing in the record before this Court indicating that Law Firm 
ever advised Reynolds that it had been or might have been negligent in the drafting of the 
Agreement. On the contrary, Law Firm has denied any negligence (R. 9). Yet, Law Firm is now 
asserting that Reynolds should not have trusted their attorneys in the suit against Quasar and that 
Reynolds were obligated to sue Law Firm even before the trier of fact determined the efficacy of 
the Agreement. 
Following Law Firm's argument through its intermediate and final conclusions, it is 
easily seen that there are many practical and even ethical considerations afoot here. 
First, the tension created by such a lawsuit by one's own clients is problematic. Both the 
Defendant attorney and the client have to be thinking "are we on the same team or not?" Can 
5 Although the late-filed and therefore useless Reply Brief filed by Mr. Krueck does seem to be compelling in 
validating the allegations found in the Complaint against Quasar. 
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they communicate freely? If the Defendant attorney hires the services of, say, Hawley Troxell, 
et al. to defend him, can client's new attorney in case number two (the malpractice action) even 
talk with the drafting attorney who is now in a dual role of Plaintiffs' counsel and Defendant in 
two separate lawsuits? 
Second, an allegation of professional negligence - a tort - must have the four elements of 
every tort in order to be successful: Duty, Breach of Duty, Proximate Causation and Damages. 
As Reynolds v. Quasar was still being adjudicated, how are any damages measured? Indeed, 
have any damages yet occurred? Is not proximate causation itself a fact issue? The answer is 
that damages cannot be determined to exist until the damage actually occurs. Nothing is until a 
court or a jury says that it is. If the trier of fact agrees with the attorney who is trying to 
vindicate his work product by reaching a result where the client is awarded what the Agreement 
calls for - together with pre-judgment interest, costs and attorney's fees - the lawsuit alleging 
professional negligence will be seen to have been wrongfully filed. The clients may then be 
liable to their drafting attorney for his or her fees, costs and expenses in defending against a 
malpractice suit that has no merit. 
As a practical matter, there may be reasons for the drafting attorney not to advise his 
clients to sue him. The attorney may honestly believe that there is zero negligence so why report 
anything otherwise to the client? Or why report anything to the malpractice carrier if there is no 
negligence? Or is this an irreconcilable conflict of interest which will cause the attorney to 
withdraw from the representation of his clients per the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, § 
1.7? The clients are then stuck with hiring a third attorney who will come in both fresh and 
ignorant of all that has gone before. More delay. Higher fees. 
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A prematurely-filed lawsuit against an attorney who has only possibly written a defective 
agreement may also cause the clients to cooperate less vigorously (or even not at all) with the 
drafting attorney on the surmise that if lawsuit number one by the attorney does not pan out, then 
they will have a lock on lawsuit number two against the same attorney for negligence. 
The court system, if Respondents have their way, is going to be burdened urmecessarily 
with many "what if" lawsuits. Presumably, this is why the Supreme Court decided in Streib v. 
Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985) that there is no necessity to file a suit against the 
possibly negligent attorney until the point of some final resolution. (This is echoed in Mack 
Financial Corporation v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 11, 720 P.2d 191, 194 (1986).) Buxton, supra, is 
explicit on this very point. " ... the existence or effect of any alleged negligence ... depended 
upon the outcome of the litigation .... There would not be objective proof of actual damage 
until that occurred .... To hold otherwise in this case 'would foment future litigation initiated on 
sheer surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequence of seeing actions 
barred by limitations. '" At 663. Citing Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 12, 720 
P.2d 191, 195 (1986). 
VIII. 
ATTORt~EY'S FEES 
Appellants' arguments in support of an award of attorney's fees are contained in their 
Opening Brief in this appeal. Those arguments are incorporated herein by reference. 
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IX. 
CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the arguments and reflections as stated above, the Appellants request that 
the Court rule the Complaint in this action was timely filed, that the Second Amended Judgment 
and all prior Judgments be vacated and the case be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings, in addition to an award of attorneys' fees and costs to the Reynolds on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <; ffi day of December, 2011. 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
By~)L. 
Dona . ojek 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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